United Citizens of Europe

Menu

The Backdoor to Brussels: Is Ukraine’s “Reverse Enlargement” a viable option?

By /

After 4 days of Russian full-scale invasion, Ukraine applied for Union Membership. Just four months later, the Commission had granted the country candidate status, with accession negotiations having formally started. In 2025, Ukraine has officially finalized the fastest screening of national legislation in the history of the European Union. The objective of this legal marathon? Pushing for EU membership by 2027 to be included in the Russia-Ukraine peace agreements. Naming the date is of strategic importance for Ukraine just as much as it is a legal puzzle for the EU. One solution has been floating in the corridors of the Berlaymont’s building: Reverse Enlargement. 

Today’s standard accession procedure dates back to the 1990s and it was designed as a slow, technical obstacle course to ensure that post-Communist states were fully compatible with Union standards. This procedure has been rigorously followed by every Country willing to join the European family, ever since the 2004 Big Bang Enlargement. The procedure allows the EU to ensure that the new entries are Union-ready, by consolidating their democratic institutions, market economy and administrative capacities. Under this Big Bang Framework, progress is monitored by the completion of 35 chapters, policy portfolios containing the entire body of EU law and standards. A state cannot join the Union unless all the requirements set by those chapters have been ticked.

Ukraine is different. While other countries look up to the perspective of membership as a distant aspiration, for Ukraine, it is a matter of geopolitical urgency. President Zelenskyy is attempting to push for Union membership to be included in the security guarantees of a future peace deal, as the backdoor to Brussels seems a more promising route to peace than NATO membership, which is currently politically unfeasible. Within the framework of Reverse Enlargement, Ukraine would secure a spot at the negotiating table of European policy-making long before the technical chapters of the accession are closed. By granting Kyiv sector-by-sector access to the Single Market, the Union would provide Ukraine with immediate agency. The puzzle is now in the hands of the Commission, which has to strike the delicate balance between geopolitical urgency and institutional rigor.

Reverse enlargement is no panacea and comes with multiple hurdles, the first of them being the fundamental principle of equality of Member States. The solution opens the way to a multi-speed Europe, where full Member States would have more decision-making power than those that are yet to formally accede. This is strongly opposed by President Zelenskyy, who publicly rejected “second-tier status” for Ukraine. He claims that his country has shown “remarkable commitment” to its bid for EU membership and has to be rewarded for its efforts despite Russia’s full-scale war. However, Zelenskyy’s rejection of halfway status hits a hard reality: the Union’s reluctance is not merely a matter of political gatekeeping, but of institutional compatibility. While Ukraine’s wartime reforms have been historic, the country continues to grapple with entrenched systemic corruption and a judiciary in transition. For Brussels, the Fundamentals’ Cluster (the rule of law and the independence of the courts) are non-negotiable. There is a profound fear among existing Member States that a fast-track accession could import these vulnerabilities into the heart of the Union, effectively undermining its democratic foundations, while fueling the perception that the accession process is not entirely merit-based, as it is claimed. 

This is of particular concern to the other fellow candidate countries. Montenegro, Albania and Moldova are considered to be the most advanced in terms of chapter negotiations. Those countries have been waiting in line for decades, while investing time and resources in aligning with the entirety of the acquis communautaire. If geopolitical interests override commitment, the predictability and trust in the European project will erode even more. A potential solution to this imbalance could be to extend reverse enlargement to all candidate countries, but this would risk turning them into perpetual associates, rather than full members. 

Beyond the readiness of the candidates, a significant hurdle is the internal institutional reform of the Union itself. It is not enough for the aspiring countries to align with European standards; the EU must also ensure it is “accession ready” to prevent total paralysis. Managing a bloc of 27 member states is already fraught with difficulty, often resulting in slow decision-making and diplomatic gridlock. Expanding to 30 members risks making the Union ungovernable. A shift to Qualified Majority Voting in key policy areas would be commendable, but finding consensus to support the reform is utterly unfeasible. 

The institutional hurdle is aggravated by a weak political will. Admitting a new candidate country requires the unanimous consent of every single member state, and as of now Ukraine is not an attractive country to welcome into the Union. With its massive population and one of the world’s largest agricultural sectors, it seriously risks disrupting the Union financial balance. If Ukraine were to join under the current rules, its vast arable land and lower GDP would likely absorb a disproportionate share of Common Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Policy Funds, therefore diverting them from current beneficiaries. Thus, despite the full-throated support to Ukraine, most member states are in fact highly reluctant to allow for a diversion of EU subsidies away from their own farmers and infrastructure projects. 

As 2026 unfolds, it is becoming clear that “naming the date” for Ukraine will require more than just legislative screening; the EU has no choice but to reinvent its own identity.  The dilemma is no longer just about where the border of Europe ends, but about what kind of Union those borders are meant to protect.

References:

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top