Novi Sad, Serbia – 1st of November, 2024. The canopy of the principal train station in the city collapses, killing 14 people on the spot, with two more dying later from their injuries. Renovation of the building was carried out by Chinese firms under the Belt and Road initiative, alongside local subcontractors with ties to Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the principal ruling force in the country since 2012. This tragedy was successful in igniting an already frustrated population due to the perceived level of corruption and widespread dissatisfaction with the political system, generating mass protests all around the nation.
Quickly after the tragedy, increased public indignation and anger led the Minister of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure to resign his position, followed by other officials.
By mid November, citizens of Novi Sad had begun a campaign of blocking main streets in the area in memory of then 14 victims, similar actions beginning in other cities. On 22nd November, students from Faculty of Dramatic Arts in Belgrade were assaulted during such a gathering, later, independent media reported that some of the attackers had links to the SNS. The assaulters were not prosecuted for their actions. Rather than intimidating the youth through violence, the event marked a turning point. Students later began a blockade in the university, action which later spread to other educational centers such as Novi Sad, Niš and Kragujevac, demanding complete disclosure of all confidential state contracts related to the station’s reconstruction, as well as political and criminal accountability for those responsible.
Using nationalist rhetoric and media control, the SNS fails to stop the ascension of the movement, accusing the students of being foreign agents from Croatia and other countries. In this period, the movement gains the moral upper hand after the Rector of the University of Belgrade, Vladan Đokić, refuses to allow police intervention on the campuses, defending the right to protest. Despite an announced intention from the ruling establishment to communicate with the angry masses, a double-down on intimidation through violence follows with actions such as the alleged use of a ‘sound cannon’ during a demonstration in Belgrade on 15th March 2025.
Regardless of the violence, arrests and censorship, the movement is able to consolidate grassroot networks, going beyond requests regarding the tragedy, reaching straight political demands such as calling for an early election, a method through which the now called ‘Student List’ (Studentska Lista) could introduce parts of the civil society in the parliament, win enough seats to form or participate in a governing majority and ultimately nominate a candidate for Prime Minister.
Why a ‘Student List’ and not a political party?
This whole movement isn’t represented by a party nor does it have a head figure in order to avoid media campaigns that would target that person and damage its capacity of reaching as much support as possible. By doing this, students are able to create the image of something that is beyond ordinary political games, increasing their legitimacy. In Serbia, party power is usually concentrated around a strong figure (Milošević, Vučić, etc), while nowadays decentralized leadership from the opposition is able to prevent issues like blackmail or arrests that could damage it. Moreover, using a big tent strategy, they’re able to attract support from all sides of the political sphere, including farmers, teachers and even ecologists. Being a party, an official position regarding certain affairs would be needed, an action that may push certain categories of voters outside of it. As most voters are tired of the old regular political parties, including official opposition from past years, a lot of people are simply not turning out to the voting ballots anymore, an issue that is addressed by the big tent strategy, attracting the voters which other parties failed to convince. However, the purpose of ‘Studentska Lista’ is not to be a ruling party, but to create a democratic reset in the country, remove censorship. reform the judicial system and push for a transition government.
Old opposition parties have failed for too many years to gain the trust of the voters, being usually fragmented, addressing their message mostly to the urban and educated middle class category of people and lacking the capacity to get it to the rural citizens. In 2020, they boycotted the parliamentary elections, a move which backfired as SNS was able to govern without any adversary. Being outside of the political centre, they’ve been left without state funds and visibility, a problem that weakened the anti-Vučić message. In late 2021 and early 2022, nationwide environmental protests triggered by the Jadar lithium mine project pushed the president to reset the political scene by dissolving the parliament, calling for early elections. This made the 3rd of April to be a massive electoral day with a presidential election, parliamentary and Belgrade local election happening at the same time. The main opposition, now with Marinika Tepić as the head figure and the Ujedinjeni za pobedu Srbije (United for the Victory of Serbia) coalition, stopped the blockade and participated in the election, gaining 13,70% of the votes, far enough from being able to create a ruling coalition, as SNS got 42,97%. The Belgrade 2022 local election is another failure, as they were unable to consolidate a ruling alliance because of ideological differences (Pro-EU and Pro-Russian groups). Being in a gridlock, Dragan Đilas, one of the party leaders, then met with the President in order to push for a redo of the elections. This meeting was seen as treason from the rest of the opposition, sparking a fragmentation in the anti-SNS bloc. Vučić took advantage of the situation and avoided pushing for another election having Belgrade under SNS control through Aleksandar Šapić (mayor) until December 2023. In May 2023, two mass shootings happened in the country, sparking yet another round of protests, the opposition reuniting through the Srbija protiv nasilja (Serbia Against Violence) coalition, Vučić dissolving the parliament again and the Belgrade leadership due to popular pressure, early elections being scheduled for 17th of December. However, widespread reports showed that election day was marked by severe democratic violations as thousands of non-residents were transported from Republika Srpska at the voting ballots in order to stop the opposition from taking control of the Serbian capital. After official counts declared a lead for the SNS, the Srbija protiv nasilja (SPN) alliance rejected the results, initiating daily protests. Several people even started a multi-day hunger strike, including Marinika Tepić, while on December 24, a demonstration in front of the Belgrade City Hall ended in violence and mass arrests. After an European Parliament resolution calling for independent investigation, deadlock and protests, forming a local government was impossible, therefore the state was forced to schedule another election on June 2, 2024. This move exposed more fractures within the SPN, parts of it deciding not to participate in the next voting session in order to not legitimize voting fraud as something normal, while some others decided to join the race. Demoralized by constant conflict within, a serious lack of voting presence made SNS able to comfortably reclaim control in Belgrade through Aleksandar Šapić as mayor. The December 17th, 2023, National Assembly vote resulted in a 23.66% score for the unified pro-European opposition (SPN), but it was all overshadowed by the reported vote fraud in the capital.
The constant fighting, internal issues, unrealized hunger strikes, etc, eventually eroded public trust in the pro-EU alliance, after the tragedy in Novi Sad on November 2024, most of the public no longer looked to party politicians in order to represent the wish for reform, creating a vacuum which later paved the way for civic associations and students to step forward, giving birth to the Studentska Lista as a necessary replacement for a failed political establishment.
According to a survey by CRTA and Stanford Democracy Action Lab, Studentska Lista is leading the polls with a 44,9% voting preference (determined citizens), surpassing SNS which stands at 35,7%. 75% of Students voters are in favour of closer ties to the European Union. For the first time in over a decade, a non-party, civic-led coalition has a clear lead over Aleksandar Vučić’s party, demonstrating that the demand for an institutional reset has moved from student blockades into mainstream politics.
Opinion:
A recent visit of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, into Belgrade, has sparked discussions regarding a possible shift into Serbia’s geopolitical strategy. I believe it’s too costly, politically speaking, for Vučić to simply adhere to sanctions against Russia or give direct aid to Ukraine. Such a decision would erase his popularity and a good chunk of his nationalist voters’ support, especially after Kosovo and Serbia verbally agreed to the Ohrid Agreement, a roadmap towards normalising relations under EU mediation. Nationalist parties accused him of giving up Kosovo without a fight. Vučić’s balancing act between global powers like Russia, China, The European Union and The United States is a careful method of maintaining open doors, while at the same time avoiding any political accountability. While in domestic politics he can appear a friend of Russia by not completely aligning with the EU on Ukraine, on a foreign basis, Serbia indirectly supplied Kyiv with Soviet ammunition worth hundreds of millions of euros by exporting that to NATO countries such as Bulgaria and Czechia which later shipped it to Ukraine. The EU position on Belgrade was more or less neutral, especially since the Ohrid Agreement is mediated by it, however this might change as the Students have a more open approach to Brussels, emboldening the European Parliament to adopt a critical resolution on Serbia this summer, stating that the country’s EU accession process has stalled due to democratic backsliding and a failure to implement key reforms. It’s hard to imagine Serbia simply aligning with Europe, even if somehow the next government is more open to it, as it is, Belgrade will still have to play the same strategy unless it officially recognizes Kosovo, ratifying the Ohrid Agreement. It would be a huge political cost to do that as most Serbs oppose officially recognizing Kosovo’s independence.
“So, the parliamentary election in Serbia will be held, as things stand, either on 18 or on 25 October” – the President has declared. He is considering stepping down from the presidency to run for Prime Minister instead, signaling that Vučić might not leave the political stage anytime soon.
Sources
- Beyond Emerging Europe. (2021). Serbian World — a dangerous idea?
- Balkanist. (2013). Inside Serbia’s Anti-Corruption War
- BalkanInsight. (2026). Serbia’s Vucic Accused of “Vote-Buying” With Cash Pledges
- BalkanInsight. (2026). Snap Elections Remain Uncertain After Serbia’s No-Confidence Vote
- EuropeanWesternBalkans. (2025). Why did the Novi Sad railway station accident trigger such large protests in Serbia?
- RFI România. (2026). Ce se întâmplă în Serbia?
- Digi24. (2026). Toamnă politică tensionată în Serbia: Aleksandar Vucic ia în calcul demisia, iar țara se pregătește pentru alegeri anticipate.